Civil War Book Review
Summer 2010

Article 14

Trailing Clouds of Glory: Zachary Taylor's Mexican War Campaign
and His Emerging Civil Leaders
Kevin Dougherty

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr

Recommended Citation
Dougherty, Kevin (2010) "Trailing Clouds of Glory: Zachary Taylor's Mexican War Campaign and His
Emerging Civil Leaders," Civil War Book Review: Vol. 12 : Iss. 3 .
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol12/iss3/14

Dougherty: Trailing Clouds of Glory: Zachary Taylor's Mexican War Campaign a

Review
Dougherty, Kevin
Summer 2010

Lewis, Felice Flanery Trailing Clouds of Glory: Zachary Taylor’s Mexican War
Campaign and His Emerging Civil Leaders. University of Alabama Press,
$35.00 ISBN 978-0-8173-1678-5
Looking at the Pre-Civil War Proving Ground
Readers have benefited from several recent treatments of the Mexican War,
including A Gallant Little Army (2007), Timothy Johnson’s well-received
chronicle of Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign. However, if the Mexican
War has been largely overshadowed by other wars, Felice Flanery Lewis
complains, “Modern historians, in emphasizing [Winfield] Scott’s brilliance,
have also tended to dismiss the significance of Taylor’s campaign" (228). She
sets out to correct this negligence in Trailing Clouds of Glory: Zachary Taylor’s
Mexican War Campaign and His Emerging Civil Leaders.
Lewis’s book is thorough and detailed. It quickly reminds the reader of the
growing dispute between the United States and Mexico and then traces Taylor’s
campaign from the formation of his Army of Observation through the key battles
of Palo Alto, Resaca, Monterrey, and Buena Vista. Lewis asserts that Taylor has
been “unfairly maligned," and her portrayal is decidedly sympathetic to Taylor
(222). She successfully argues that common criticisms that Taylor was
excessively critical of West Pointers and dismissive of Scott are unwarranted,
but in other areas she is less convincing.
Taylor is routinely criticized for his inattention to detailed logistical
planning, and an oft-cited example is the army’s move to Corpus Christi. Lewis
quotes the highly observant Colonel Ethan Allen Hitchcock liberally throughout
the book, but fails to record his assessment that the landing at Corpus Christi was
“little short of a miracle" and attributable to the “mere accident" of a calm bay
(Fifty Years in Camp and Field, 194). She downplays the delay in the crossing of
the Arroyo Colorado caused by a lack of bridging materials. Had the Mexicans
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chosen to defend the crossing, Taylor would have been vulnerable. Likewise
Lewis passes on the opportunity to explore Taylor’s overextended logistics at
Fort Brown.
In addition to a lack of detailed logistical planning, historians have
questioned some of Taylor’s tactical decisions. Again, Lewis attempts to parry
these criticisms, most notably at Monterrey. She explains Taylor’s failure to
subdue the Citadel because he “lacked sufficient firepower," but neglects to
mention Taylor had decided to leave his heavy artillery behind in Camargo
(158). She also suggests Taylor had no intention that Major Joseph Mansfield,
who she identifies as a mere “engineer staff officer," would directly lead the
attack of John Garland, who she calls “an experienced infantry colonel" (143). It
is unclear why Lewis finds such use of Mexican War engineers unusual since
Captain Robert E. Lee similarly personally guided Brigadier General David
Twiggs’s attack at Cerro Gordo. Nonetheless, Lewis calls Mansfield and Garland
“an unfortunate team for the job," seemingly to deflect responsibility from
Taylor (141). Later, she only grudgingly admits historical criticism of Taylor for
attacking with Garland’s small, unsupported force “may have been a valid point"
(158). Lewis also fails to scrutinize the wisdom of Taylor’s armistice with Major
General Pedro de Ampudia after Monterrey, and offers only a token analysis of
Taylor’s decision to move forward from his defensive position at Monterrey, a
decision which led to what some historians consider the unnecessary battle of
Buena Vista (180). Fans of Jefferson Davis will find Lewis’s downplaying of the
Mississippi Rifles’ contribution to Buena Vista and her questioning of the
“inspiration" of Davis’s inverted V tactic challenging.
Lewis undoubtedly and openly admires Taylor, stating that he “deserves to
be honored…" for his “remarkable record as commander of the Army of
Occupation" (228). She set out to accomplish this task, and she has done it well.
As she points out, there are numerous other sources available for the reader who
wishes to find criticism of Taylor. Hers is a well-written, informative, and
defendable argument on Taylor’s behalf.
Historians have long generalized that the Mexican War was a formative
experience for the junior officers there who would go on to be the generals of the
Civil War. Recent works, beginning with John Waugh’s The Class of 1846
(1994), have added a certain amount of definition to this admittedly slippery
subject. Lewis’s subtitle states that her book aims to contribute to this discussion.
While she carefully mentions the names of numerous Mexican War veterans
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who went on to be Civil War leaders, the depth of her analysis is often slim and
the result mixed. For example, the book specifically purports to offer “largely
unknown aspects of the Mexican War service of Daniel Harvey Hill, Braxton
Bragg, and Thomas W. Sherman" (as quoted from the book’s dust jacket). Lewis
indeed provides fresh information about Hill, but Bragg’s Mexican War career is
already one of the more commonly reported so this is an odd case to single out,
and Lewis’s coverage of Sherman is as casual as most other Mexican War
histories.
Lewis downplays the significance of the role Mexico played in the evolution
of the future Civil War leadership, arguing that prior to Mexico these men were
“already well schooled in military skills," largely by virtue of their West Point
attendance (xv). Surely Lewis must appreciate the difference between experience
as a cadet and experience in combat. Instead, however, she argues that the
significance of the combat experience is “unclear" and does little to advance the
reader’s understanding (220). Unraveling the connection is without a doubt a
difficult task, because, as Lewis correctly notes that Mexico’s influence was felt
“indirectly rather than directly" (220). Still, recent authors such as Martin
Dugard in The Training Ground (2008) have tackled the subject in a more
straightforward, if still imperfect, manner, and Lewis’s subtitle suggests she too
should have been more forthcoming in her effort.
Trailing Clouds of Glory is an essential addition to any Mexican War library
because of its focus on Taylor. It is also a useful addition to the growing effort to
move beyond generalizations and determine the specifics of the influence
Mexico had on Civil War leadership. On this front, Lewis has carefully
chronicled where the future Civil War generals were on the Mexican War
battlefield, and in some cases provided speculation of the impact. (For example,
she identifies the possibility that John Magruder’s witnessing a Mexican ruse at
the Arroyo Colorado influenced his demonstration on the Virginia Peninsula in
the Civil War (49). More such examples, even though speculative, would be
welcome.) While Lewis significantly contributes to the understanding of the
causal relationship between experience in Mexico and leadership in the Civil
War, the definitive book on the subject remains unwritten.
Kevin Dougherty is an instructor in the Department of History at The
University of Southern Mississippi. He is the author of Civil War Leadership and
Mexican War Experience. His Weapons of Mississippi is forthcoming from the
University Press of Mississippi.
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